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I consider an economy populated by case-based decision makers. Consumption can
betransferredbetweentheperiodsbymeansofarisklessstoragetechnologyorarisky
asset with i.i.d. dividend payments. I analyze the dynamics of asset holdings and as-
set prices and identify the influence of the aspiration level, the length of memory
and the form of the similarity function. The height of the aspiration level determines
whether the economy exhibits constant prices and asset holdings or evolves in a cy-
cle. The length of memory is associated with the ability of the investors to learn the
correct distribution of returns, whereas the form of the similarity function influences
the willingness of investors to diversify.
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The case-based decision theory was proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) as an alterna-
tive theory for decision making under uncertainty. Differently from the expected utility theory,
it models a situation of structural ignorance. Hence, neither states of the world, nor their prob-
abilities are assumed to be known. The sole source of learning is experience, captured by the
concept of memory. An act is evaluated based on its past performance as well as on the perfor-
mance of similar acts in similar circumstances. An aspiration level is used as a bench-mark in
the evaluation process. It distinguishes results considered satisfactory, i.e. those exceeding the
aspiration level, which make an act more attractive, from the unsatisfactory ones.
The case-based decision theory has been applied in several economic contexts
2. However, up to
my knowledge, it has not been used to model decision-making in financial markets. A model of
financial markets, in which expected utility maximization is replaced by case-based reasoning
is of interest for several reasons. First, it allows to gain a better understanding of the case-based
decision theory itself. Second, it contributes to the financial market literature by describing the
dynamicsofportfolioholdingsandassetpricesinamarketwithcase-basedinvestors. Theanaly-
sis of the behavior implied by case-based reasoning allows for comparisons to the predictions
of the standard theory, as well as to the empirical findings.
The ’’stateless’’ approach to model behavior in financial markets requires some justification.
Since the works of Arrow (1970, p. 98), it has been assumed that the expected utility frame-
work naturally fits the description of an asset in terms of a probability distribution over state-
contingent outcomes. However, a thorough consideration of this framework shows that the
problem of formulating states of nature in the context of financial market might have no natural
solution. Besides the problem of deciding, which payoffs of a security should be considered
possible, the question of correlation among the payoffs of different assets arises. Hence, it is not
a solution of the problem to identify the states of the world with the payoffs an asset renders
3.
Moreover, in a market environment, payoffs are determined by capital gains, hence by equi-
2 As for instance, in the consumer theory, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997, 2001 a), Gilboa and Pazgal (2001),
theory of voting, Aragones (1997 a), production theory, Jahnke, Chwolka and Simons (2001), social learning,
Blonski (1999), cooperation in games, Pazgal (1997), herding behavior, Krause (2003), choices among lotteries,
Gayer (2003).
3 See Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (2000, p.296) for a discussion of the problems connected with the construction
of states.
2librium prices, which themselves depend on the expectations of the market participants. The
well known beauty contest used by Keynes (1936) to describe the expectation formation in as-
set markets illustrates this point. As Arthur (1995, p. 23) notes ’’[w]here forming expectations
means predicting an aggregate outcome that is formed in part from others’ expectations, expec-
tation formation can become self-referential. The problem of logically forming expectations
then becomes ill-defined, and rational deduction finds itself with no bottom ground to stand
upon’’. Since the case-based decision theory does not rely on the definition of states and state-
contingent outcomes or on formation of probabilisticbeliefs, it allowsto addresstheseproblems
in a formal model.
Apart from this methodological issue connected with the application of the expected utility the-
ory to model financial markets, the empirical literature has identified multiple violations of the
joint hypothesis of expected utility maximization and rational expectations. The approach usu-
ally chosen in the literature to address these issues consists in studying the behavior of investors
who satisfy the hypothesis of expected utility maximization but have biased beliefs about the
distribution of future returns. For instance, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and
Gervais and Odean (2001) provide an explanation of excessive trading frequency based on the
self-attribution bias. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990b), Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) assume that traders condition their
behavior on past returns, which induces positive correlation of asset returns. De Long, Shleifer,
Summers and Waldmann (1990a), as well as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show how noise traders
generate arbitrage possibilities in a theoretical model.
In contrast to this work, in this paper the framework of the expected utility theory is completely
abandoned and replaced by the framework of the case-based decision theory. The influence of
itsthreemajorparameters—aspirationlevel,memoryandsimilarityperceptions—onportfolio
holdings and price dynamics is examined.
It is found that investors with relatively low aspiration levels behave in a satisficing manner,
choosingconstant,butpossiblysuboptimalportfoliosovertime. Aneconomypopulatedbysuch
investors, therefore, exhibits constant prices. In contrast, investors with high aspiration levels
constantly switch among the available portfolios causing stochastic or deterministic cycles.
The memory of the individuals plays a crucial role for the dynamic. In order to study the in-
3fluence of the length of memory on decisions, I analyze two extreme cases — the case of one-
periodmemoryandthecaseofinfinitememory. Investorswithshortmemoryareunabletolearn
enough about the possible price and dividend realizations in order to make optimal choices. The
behavior of such investors is either stationary but suboptimal, or exhibits cycles. The ability to
remember long sequences of realizations per se does not insure optimal behavior in the limit,
either. The results of the paper show that long memory leads to optimal behavior, only if the
aspiration level is appropriately chosen and the similarity function is convex.
The perceived similarity between portfolios is found to influence choices in a non-trivial way.
The curvature of the similarity function determines whether an individual exhibits preferences
for diversification. A similarity function that is concave in the Euclidean distance leads in-
vestorswithrelatively highaspirationlevelstochooseonlyundiversified portfolios. Incontrast,
a convex similarity function combined with a high aspiration level implies that an investor will
experiment with almost all diversified portfolios in the limit.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I introduce the model of the economy and the
case-based decision rule and define the notion of equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics
of the economy and determines the long-run distribution of the asset-prices for the case of one-
period memory. In section 4, the case of long memory is considered. Section 5 discusses the
findings in the light of the empirical literature from financial markets and section 6 concludes.
The proofs of the results are stated in the appendix.
2T h e E c o n o m y
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of investors, uniformly distributed on the in-
terval [0;1]. There are two types of investors, i ∈ {1;2}. The share of type 1 is denoted by
θ1 ∈ (0;1) and assumed constant over time.
There is a single consumption good in the economy. Each investor lives for two periods and
consumes only in the second period of his life. Preferences over consumption are represented
by a utility function u(·), which is identical for all investors. I assume:
(A1) u(·) is strictly monotonically increasing and continuous in consumption in period two.
The young investors are endowed with one unit of the consumption good. The endowment of
4the old investors is 0.
There are two assets: a risky asset a and a riskless asset b. The riskless asset b delivers (1 + r)
units of consumption per unit invested. It is available in perfectly elastic supply at a price of 1.
The supply of a is fixed at 1. Its payoff per unit is δt ∼Q £
δ;¯ δ
¤
and δt is i.i.d. across time. Q
is assumed to be continuous and g(·) denotes its density
4.T h ep r i c eo fa at time t is pt. Short
sales are prohibited.
In the spirit of the case-based decision theory, I assume that the investors in the economy have
almost no information about the problem they are facing. They do not know the structure of the
economy, the process of price formation, or the possible prices and returns of the assets and their
distribution. Their information consists of the problem formulation, the set of possible acts and
their memory.
2.1 Problems, acts and utility realizations
Eachinvestorsolvestheproblem: ’’foragivenequilibriumpricept,investtheinitialendowment
in a portfolio to enable consumption’’. In general, the description of an investment problem
might also depend on multiple factors, such as initial endowment, price level, etc. In this model,
however, pt fully characterizes the market situation. Hence, a decision problem is identified
with pt.
Let αi
t denote the share of initial endowment invested in a (αi
t ∈ [0;1]) at time t by an investor
of type i ∈ {1;2}.
























The aspiration level is the lowest level of utility which renders the investor satisfied with his
choice. I assume that the two types of investors differ with respect to their aspiration levels ¯ u1
4 Q is interpreted as the objective probability distribution known to an external observer, but not to the investors
in the economy. Hence, Q will be irrelevant for the investors’ decisions. However, the specification of Q makes it
possible to analyze the long-run behavior of the economy.
5and ¯ u2. Typically, the aspiration level would be updated according to the past experience of a
decision-maker. I will assume, however that the aspiration levels remain constant over time,
and will derive the price and portfolio dynamics depending on the aspiration level. Introducing
an updating rule would change the limit results of the process
5. However, if the updating is
relatively slow, the results derived here would still describe the interim dynamics of the process
for different ranges of values that ¯ u1 and ¯ u2 can assume.
2.3 Similarity




s((p;α);(p0;α0)) can be interpreted as the likelihood assigned to the event that portfolio α
bought at price p renders the same utility as portfolio α0 bought at price p0.
6
I use the Euclidean distance between (p;α) and (p0;α0) as a measure of similarity. Note that the
prohibition of short sales and the fixed endowments imply pt ∈ [0;1]. Hence, (p;α) ∈ [0;1]
2.




0)) = f (k(p;α) − (p
0;α
0)k),




The memory of an investor describes his information about past utility realizations of available
portfolios. Letthememoryofaninvestoroftypei ∈ {1;2}consistonlyofcases(pt;αi
t;vt+1 (αi
t))
5 The most common empirically observed aspiration level updating rule is
¯ ut+1 =( 1− β)¯ ut + βut,
where β is a constant which captures the speed of adjustment. With a single act α and an i.i.d. random process
ut, this process is known to converge in expectation to the mean value of u(α). With several acts (preserving the
i.i.d. properties of the utility realizations), however, Börgers and Sarin (2000) demonstrate that optimal choice in
the limit fails to obtain unless the optimal alternative is dominant or riskless.
6 The concept closest in spirit to similarity is covariance, which, however, relies on the definition of state-
contingent outcomes and their distribution. Hence, its usage does not seem appropriate in a model case-based
decisions. Matsui (2000) establishes a connection between the two notions.
6experienced by investors of previous generations of his own type























m ∈ {1;2...t}parameterizesthelengthofmemory: m = t, correspondstorememberingallpast
cases, m =1stays for one-period memory. Although these extreme cases do not seem realistic,
they allow a tractable analysis and provide an intuition about the influence of the length of
memory on the price dynamics.
I assume that only actually observed cases are considered by each investor. This can be justified
by the fact that people usually consider their actual experience to be more important than hy-
pothetical cases. Alternatively, the construction of hypothetical cases might be connected with
somerealormentalcosts. Forinstance,mutualandinvestmentfundsdonotprovideinformation
about all past returns in their brochures, but only a selective past history. The model presented
here is quite extreme in that it assumes that hypothetical cases are assigned a weight of 0.I f
the similarity between hypothetical and actual cases is sufficiently low, the results of this paper
would still hold.
InGuerdjikova(2004b, pp. 204-209), hypothetical casesareintroducedandtheireffectonasset
prices and portfolio holdings discussed. I comment on these results and their connection to the
current model in section 6 .
2.5 Case-Based Decision Making
Since in period t =0 , the memory of the investors is empty, let α0 ∈ (0;1) be the act chosen
12
in period 0 by both types and let p0 = α0 be the equilibrium price at t =0 .
In all consequent periods, the investors choose the portfolio with maximal cumulative utility at























Hence, the evaluation of a portfolio α at time t increases, if portfolios considered similar to α
11 This means that investors do not observe all past choices and realizations, but only those of a given cohort of
their predecessors. One possibility to relax this assumption is by introducing social learning, as in Blonski (1999)
and Krause (2003).
12 The results for α0 =1and α0 =0are qualitatively the same, the interesting case is, however, the one of a
diversified initial portfolio. The assumption that α0 is identical for both types is made for convinience, but would
also leave the results qualitatively unchanged.
7performed above the aspiration level when bought at prices similar to pt.
2.6 Equilibrium Paths
Definition 1 Given the initial allocation α0 and the initial price p0 = α0, an equilibrium
path of the economy is defined as a vector of asset prices (p∗
t)t=0,1,... and a vector of portfo-
lios (α1∗
t ;α2∗
t )t=0,1,... chosen by the young investors at t (with α1∗
0 = α0, α2∗
0 = α0, p∗
0 = p0)
such that:
(i) young investors make case-based decisions in each period:
α
i∗





































(ii) the market for the risky asset is cleared in each period: either p∗














t (0) + α
2∗
t (0) = 0.
The market clearing condition allows for degenerate equilibria, in which the demand for a and
its price are 0. Guerdjikova (2003) shows that such equilibria occur for high values of ¯ u1 and
¯ u2. In order to exclude equilibria with pt =0 , I assume that ¯ u1 is sufficiently low. Hence, the
investors of type 1 are always willing to hold a positive quantity of the risky asset.
(A2) Let ¯ u1 <u
³
θ1α0+δ
1−θ1(1−α0)α0 +( 1− α0)(1+r)
´
.
(A2) insures that α1∗
t = α0 and pt ≥ θ1α0 for all t ≥ 1.
(A2) is a very strong assumption, since it postulates that investors of type 1 never deviate from
their initially chosen portfolio. I comment on the effects from dropping (A2) after I state the
main results of the paper.
To avoid the discussion of multiple cases, let
1 > ¯ δ >r>α0r>δ ≥ 0.
83 Price Dynamics with One-Period Memory
Let m =1 , hence, the investors only remember the last case observed. Since α1∗
t = α0,o n l y
the behavior of type 2 needs to be considered. Depending on ¯ u2, the following results obtain:









α0 +( 1− α0)(1+r)
¶
.( 1 )
Then, there is an equilibrium path on which α1∗
t = α0, α2∗
t = α0 and p∗

















Then, on almostallpaths of dividend realizations ˜ ω =( δ1;δ2...δt...), there is an equilibrium
path, such that α1∗
t = α0, α2∗
t =0and p∗
t = θ1α0 for all t ≥ ¯ t(˜ ω),f o rs o m e¯ t(˜ ω).








. Then on almost all paths of dividend
realizations ˜ ω, there is a time ¯ t(˜ ω), such that for all t ≥ ¯ t(˜ ω) the economy evolves
a c c o r d i n gt oas t o c h a s t i ccycle with two states:
h, with α1
h = α0, α2
h =1and ph =1− θ1 (1 − α0)
and
l, with α1
h = α0, α2
l =0and pl = θ1α0.



























. Then, on almost all paths of dividend realizations ˜ ω,t h e r e
is a time ¯ t(˜ ω) such that for all t ≥ ¯ t(˜ ω) the economy evolves in a deterministic cycle of
period 2 with two states h and l, as described in 3.
9The proposition shows that relatively low aspiration levels (as in parts 1. and 2.) lead to stable
pricesandassetallocationsintheeconomy. Type2 issatisfied withthereturnsoftheirportfolios
and has no incentive to experiment and change portfolio holdings with time.
The proof of part 2. of proposition 1 further demonstrates that for α0 < 1
2, the price of a may
continually rise for a finite number of periods before it stabilizes at pl. The price increases in
periods of low dividends. Intuitively, when type 2 investors are unsatisfied with the return of a
portfolio, they try to switch to a portfolio which is furthest away from the initially chosen one.
Ifα0 < 1
2, the switch fromα2
t−1 = α0 to α2
t =1 , causes pt to rise abovep0 and, hence, the utility
derived from α0 may exceed ¯ u2. If this is the case, the equilibrium conditions require type 2 to
be indifferent among all portfolios and to choose a portfolio α ∈ (α0;1), which implies pt >p 0.
Thisprocesscontinuesuntilα2∗
T > 1
2 obtainsinsomeperiodT.O n c eα2 exceeds 1
2,asufficiently
low realization of δ will force type 2 to switch to b. Afterwards, the economy remains in state l
forever.
Conversely, if ¯ u2 is relativelyhigh(as inparts 3. and4.), so that type 2 investors are not satisfied
with the returns of b and with some of the returns of a, they will permanently switch between
the two corner portfolios and the economy will evolve in a cycle.
The results of proposition 1 hinge on (A2). It seems, however, that relaxing (A2) will not sig-
nificantly change the patterns of the dynamic. Specifically, the conclusion of constant prices
and portfolio holdings will still be true as long as both aspiration levels are low relative to the
equilibrium payoffs. In contrast, when the aspiration levels of both types of investors are rel-
atively high, so that at least some of the equilibrium payoffs are deemed unsatisfactory, cycles
































and whenever the behavior of a given type is cyclical, this type will only hold corner portfolios.
The dynamics of the economy will still follow a Markov process and the frequencies of the
states can be computed by finding its invariant distribution. Assumption (A2) is useful in that
it allows for an explicit computation of these frequencies and makes it possible to compare the
price patterns with empirical findings in section 5.
In proposition 1, the assumption of strictly decreasing similarity function implies that investors
with high aspiration levels diversify only for a finite number of periods. As long as the memory
10is short, this result is independent of the curvature of s(·;·). In contrast, with long memory, the
curvature of s(·;·)determines the willingness of the investors diversify.
4 Price Dynamics with Long Memory
In this section, I assume that memory contains all past cases, i.e. m = t. The introduction of
long memory allows to study the effects of learning on asset prices and portfolio holdings.
I first consider the case of a concave similarity function.
4.1 The Case of Concave Similarity
Let f0 < 0 and let e denote the Euclidean distance functional. Concavity of the similarity







is negative definite. Since e(·;·)is concave, this assumptions implies that f should not be too
convex.
Denote by µ(α | p) the expected utility from holding portfolio α ∈ [0;1] at time t, given that
the price of α remains constant at p = pt = pt+1:














∗ (α)= :α0θ1 +( 1− θ1)α for α ∈ [0;1]
be the equilibrium price which obtains if α1∗ = α0 and α2∗ = α. To avoid the discussion of
multiple cases, assume:
µ(α0 | p0) <u(1 + r) <µ(1 | p
∗ (1)) (3)
Since the memory of type 2 contains all past cases, their behavior in the long run is determined
by the mean of the observed utility realizations computed at equilibrium prices. The concavity
of the similarity function implies that there is a ¯ t, such that for all t ≥ ¯ t, α2∗
t ∈ {0;1}. Condition
(3), therefore, assumes one possible ordering of the mean utilities of the portfolios actually
chosen by type 2.
11Proposition 2 Define ˆ δ as:
u
Ã
1 − θ1 (1 − α0)+ˆ δ




Suppose that for some ζ > 0, g(·) is continuous w. r . t. the Lebesgue measure and strictly
bounded away from 0 on
h
ˆ δ − ζ;ˆ δ + ζ
i
.
1. If ¯ u2 <µ(α0 | p0), the expected time during which type 2 holds α0 is infinite. Hence,
the expected time which the economy spends in the state (α1 = α0;α2 = α0;p = p0) is
infinite.
2. If ¯ u2 ∈ (µ(α0 | p0);u(1 + r)),t y p e2 chooses either α2∗
t =1with frequency 1 or α2∗
t =0
with frequency 1 a.s. in the limit. Hence, on almost each path, the state of the economy is
either (α1 = α0;α2 =0 ;p = p0) with frequency 1 or (α1 = α0;α2 =1 ;p = p∗ (1)) with
frequency 1.
3. If ¯ u2 ∈ (u(1 + r);µ(1 | p∗ (1))),t y p e2 chooses α2∗
t =1with frequency 1 a.s. in the
limit. The state of the economy is a.s. (α1 = α0;α2 =1 ;p = p∗ (1)) with frequency 1.
4. If ¯ u2 >µ(1 | p∗ (1)),t y p e2 holds α2∗
t =1 , respectively α2∗
t =0with strictly positive
frequencies πh, respectively πl a.s. in the limit, whereas the frequencies of all other acts




u(1 + r) − ¯ u2
µr
1 − ¯ u2 ,
where µr
1 denotes the actual mean utility derived by holding asset a as observed by the
investors of type 2. Hence, the economy a.s. evolves according to a stochastic cycle with
two states h and l, as described in proposition 1.
The interpretation of the results is similar to those derived with one-period memory. The main
difference consists in the fact that with long memory, the investors of type 2 whose aspiration
level lies between the maximal achievable mean utilities of the undiversified portfolios will
learn to choose the one with the higher mean utility. Hence, long memory combined with a
correctly chosen aspiration level enhances optimal behavior. Nevertheless, with a concave sim-
ilarity function investors do not choose diversified portfolios make suboptimal decisions in the
limit. The result is due to the fact that similaritydoes not decrease sufficiently fast in the Euclid-
ean distance. Hence, an investor who eventually observes only the (unsatisfactory) realizations
12of the corner portfolios tends to overestimate their negative impact on the diversified portfolios.
Thenextstepoftheanalysisconsistsinrelaxingtheassumptionofaconcavesimilarityfunction.
4.2 The Case of Non-Concave Similarity Function
Note that the similarity function which has a maximum at ((p;α);(p;α)) cannot be convex







is positive semidefinite for all (α;p) 6=( α0;p0).
(A3) implies that for a given (α;p), s((α;p);(α0;p0)) is convex on any set ˆ A ⊂ [0;1]
2 such that
(α;p) / ∈ ˆ A.
(A3) finds empirical support in the literature. Shepard (1962) (a), (b) and Kruskal (1964) (a)
and (b) suggest a method which allows them to construct the similarity function as a monotonic
function of the Euclidean distance on a space which is derived from the observed data and esti-
mate its exact shape. Shepard (1987, p. 1318) depicts the estimates of a similarity function for
twelve different experiments, most of them conducted with humans, in which the ability to dis-
tinguish between different stimuli (e.g. sizes, lightness, etc.) was tested
13. The results strongly
suggest that the similarity function is convex in the Euclidean distance and resembles an ex-
ponential function, which justifies assumption (A3). However, it would be of interest to test










denote the set of past periods in which type 2 has chosen α and let |C2
t (α)| be the cardinality of
this set.
Proposition 3 Assume (A3).I ff o ra l lα ∈ [0;1],
µ(α | p
∗ (α)) < ¯ u
2,
then there is no x ∈ (0;1)such that for all portfolios α ∈ Bx( ) (where Bx ( ) is an open ball
13 Unfortunately, empirical results on the form of the similarity function are sparse in economics. The few ex-
ceptions of which I am aware, are the works of Buschena and Zilberman (1995, 1999) and Zizzo (2002). Their
findings show that similarity between acts is negatively correlated to the Euclidean distance between payoffs and
influences decisions under risk.
13with radius   around x), |C2









Proposition 4 Assume (A3).I ff o rs o m eα ∈ [0;1],
µ(α | α0θ1 + α(1 − θ1)) > ¯ u
2,
then the investors of type 2 a.s. choose a portfolio
α
∗ ∈ ˜ A =
©
α ∈ [0;1] | µ(α | α0θ1 + α(1 − θ1)) > ¯ u
2ª
with frequency 1 in the limit.
The aspiration level determines whether or not the economy will converge to a stationary state.
Whereaswitharelativelylowaspirationlevel, type2eventuallylearnstochooseoneoftheport-
folios they consider satisfactory, a high aspiration level implies that type 2 constantly switches
among the available portfolios and the economy never reaches a stationary point. Proposition 4
does not insure the choice of an optimal portfolio, but it shows that for an appropriately chosen
¯ u2, the optimal choice can be approximated with an arbitrary precision.
The results derived in this section allow us to differentiate between the influence of the form of
the similarity function and the influence of the aspiration level. The curvature of the similarity
function determines whether investors with high aspiration levels will be willing to diversify.
Whereasaconcavesimilarityfunctionimpliesthattheinvestorsoftype2holdonlyundiversified
portfolios after switching away from α0, with a non-concave similarity function this result is
no longer valid. On the contrary, a relatively high aspiration level combined with a convex
similarity function implies that type 2 will explore the whole space of available portfolios and
will hold a diversified portfolio a.s. with frequency 1 in the limit.
5 Implications for Portfolio Holdings and Asset Prices
The results of the last section have shown that it is possible to identify conditions under which
case-basedinvestorsmakealmostoptimalchoicesinthelimit. Ingeneral, however, thebehavior
of case-based investors differs from the predictions of the standard models. Hence, case-based
investors can induce asset price patterns which are documented in the empirical literature and
whichareviewedasinconsistentwithexpectedutilityhypothesiscombinedwithrationalexpec-
tations. In this section, I discuss how the findings of the paper relate to some of the paradoxes
14observed in financial markets such as the presence of arbitrage opportunities, bubbles, limited
market participation and underdiversification.
5.1 Arbitrage Possibilities, Bubbles and Excessive Volatility
The notion of arbitrage is fundamental to the theory of asset pricing. Unused arbitrage possibil-
ities are nevertheless found in real and experimental markets, see Rosenthal and Y oung (1990),
LamontandThaler(2001),Shleifer(2000,Chapter3),OlivenandRietz(1995)andRietz(1998).
The fact that states of nature are not defined in the case-based decision theory means that ob-
jectively given arbitrage possibilities might not be perceived by individual investors and remain
unused. Consider, e.g. the case of short memory and low aspiration level. If the share of the
investors of type 1, θ1 is relatively low,
δ ≥ rθ1α0
and (2) holds, the stationary state of the economy exhibits arbitrage possibilities. Obviously, the
sameeffectcanarisewith longmemory, butrelatively lowaspirations, asinpart2ofproposition
2.
Theempiricalliteraturedocumentsbubblesanddeviationsofassetpricesfromfundamentalval-
ues, see Kindleberger (1978) and Sunder (1995). Note that in the model presented here, there is
no population growth, which (combined with r>0) implies that the economy is dynamically
efficient and, hence, a bubble can not be an equilibrium under rational expectations. Neverthe-
less, the proof of part 2 of proposition 1 demonstrates that a bubble can emerge and burst in this
economy. If the fundamental value of a (defined as usual with respect to the actual distribution
of returns and using u(·) as a von Neumann Morgenstern utility index) lies between pl and 1,
the risky asset will be overvalued during the bubble and undervalued after the bubble bursts.
Notefurtherthatinthemodelpresentedinthispaperthepriceunderrationalexpectationswould
beconstant. Nevertheless,forrelativelyhighvaluesof ¯ u2,weobserveexcessivepricevolatility
14
due to changes in α2
t. The price fluctuations have a greater amplitude, the higher the value of
1 − θ1, i.e. the relative share of type 2. Moreover, type 2 investors switch from α =0to α =1
in periods of high prices (pt = ph) and switch from α =1to α =0in periods of low prices
(pt = pl), hence they trade at a loss.
14 See Shiller (1981, 1990) for empirical evidence on excessive volatility.
155.2 Financial Market Participation
Empirical studies show that a large proportion of the consumers in the US do not hold risky
assets, see e.g. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). This is usually explained by the presence of transac-
tion costs and liquidity needs, see Allen Gale (1994), Williamson (1994). Unfortunately, these
two factors provide merely a partial explanation of the empirical evidence. Moreover, although
the effect is more prevalent among the poor parts of the population, a significant proportion
(47,7%) of the rich households abstain from holding risky assets as well. This last fact can
hardly be justified by prohibitively high participation costs or liquidity needs.
Another explanation of the limited participation paradox stems from Cao, Wang and Zhang
(2005), who use perceived ambiguity about the distribution of returns. Limited participation
results in their model when the variance of the perceived ambiguity in the population is very
high. Only investors whose perceived ambiguity is small enter the market. However, their re-
sults predict that limited participation would lead to undervaluation of the risky asset, contrary
to the equity premium puzzle documented by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The model analyzed in the previous sections provides a different criterion according to which
participating investors can be distinguished from those who do not hold risky assets: their aspi-
ration level. With short memory, investors with low aspiration levels (case 1 of proposition 1)
will hold risky assets, independently of the current market prices. Investors with high aspiration
levels, in contrast, (case 3 of proposition (1)) would only participate in the asset market if both
prices and dividends are high and leave the market, once the dividends become low and returns
fallbelowtheiraspirationlevel. Ifsuchinvestorsarepresent, marketparticipationincreasesdur-
ing market booms and drops after market crashes. Investors with intermediate aspiration levels,
(case 2 of proposition 1) will never be active in the market for risky assets in the long-run.
In the case of long memory, two factors determine market participation: the aspiration level
and the curvature of the similarity function. As long as the similarity function is concave, the
results for market participation are almost identical to those with short memory. In contrast,
when assumption (A3) is satisfied, investors with high aspiration levels always participate in
the market for risky assets. Hence, full market participation obtains.
165.3 The Equity Premium Puzzle
Market participation is often connected to the equity premium puzzle described by Mehra and
Prescott(1985). Empiricalstudiesshowthatthecoefficientofriskaversionneededtojustifythe
excessivereturnsonriskyassets(ascomparedtobonds)ismuchlowerwhenlimitedmarketpar-
ticipation is taken into account, see Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) and Vissing-Jorgenssen
(2002). Vissing-Jorgenssen and Attanasio (2003) use the Epstein-Zin type of preferences which
allow them to obtain even better results by separating intertemporal preferences from risk aver-
sion.
As will be shown in subsection 5.4, the case-based decision theory allows for a similar separa-
tion between the curvature of the utility function u(·) and preferences for diversification and,
therefore, produces effects similar to those present in Vissing-Jorgenssen and Attanasio (2003).
Intuitively, keepingtheaspirationlevelconstant, varyingthecurvatureof u(·)changesthemean
utility which could be potentially derived from holding diversified portfolios as compared to
non-diversified ones. At the same time, whether the decision-maker will actually choose diver-
sified portfolios is determined by the curvature of his similarity function. Hence, even investors
with a concave utility u(·) might fail to choose a diversified portfolio.
















For the cases, in which p∗
t = p∗ for all t,w ec a nw r i t et h ea v e r a g ee x c e s sr e t u r no ft h er i s k y

















dQ(δ) − (1 + r) > 0
obtains on the equilibrium path. Note, that we can obtain this result for any utility function u(·)
by just varying θ1, ¯ u2 and s(·;·). In contrast, in a model with expected utility maximizers, the
excessreturnwouldbeuniquelydeterminedbythecurvatureoftheirvonNeumannMorgenstern
utility index.
17Suppose now that people behave as expected utility maximizers when faced with choices over
lotteries and as case-based decision makers when facing choices for which states of the worlds
and probabilities are not explicitly specified. In both cases, however, they use the same function
u(·) to evaluate outcomes. Suppose further that we measure the risk-aversion of a population
of decision -makers for choices over lotteries in an experiment and find them to be risk-neutral.
Nevertheless, we may find that these decision-makers demand a non-zero risk premium when
trading in an asset market. Especially, if u(·) is linear and condition (2) (for the case of short
memory) or the condition of part 2 of proposition 2 (for the case of long memory) hold, the risky
asset is undervalued relative to the bond. Observationally, this would mimic the equity premium
puzzle observed by Mehra and Prescott (1985) for appropriately chosen values of θ1.
5.4 Preferences for Diversification
Differently from the expected utility theory, which does not allow for a separation between de-
creasing marginal utility and risk aversion, case-based decision-makers may exhibit decreasing
marginal utility (concave u(·)) and still prefer to hold an undiversified portfolio in the limit if
their similarity function is concave. Underdiversification has been recorded in the empirical
literature, see Tesar and Werner (1995), Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Barber and Odean
(2000). The last paper documents that most of the investors engage in high frequency trading,
while holding only a small number of different assets in their portfolios (about 4). This would
be consistent with the assumption of a concave similarity function combined with a relatively
high aspiration level, as in part 4 of proposition 2.
Thepreferencesofacase-baseddecision-makerarecapturedbythecumulativeutilityheassigns
to different acts. In general, they vary over time. To derive meaningful statements about the

















18and all β ∈ [0;1],
limt→∞Ui




if both the numerator and the denominator converge to +∞and
limt→∞Ui




if the numerator and the denominator converge to −∞.
Note that the definition of preference for diversification depends (through Ui
t) on the chosen
equilibriumpath. However,itwillbeshownthattheemergenceofpreferencesfordiversification
will depend only on the aspiration level and on the form of the similarity function and not on
t h es p e c i f i cp a t hω.
The following corollaries obtain:
Corollary 5
15Assume (A3). On any equilibrium path, both types of investors exhibit prefer-
ence for diversification.
Corollary 6 Suppose that the similarity function is concave. On any equilibrium path, type
1exhibits preferences for diversification. Type 2 exhibits preferences for diversification if and
only if ¯ u2 <µ(1 | p∗ (1)).
6C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper has analyzed the dynamics of an OLG economy with case-based investors.
The main findings concern the influence of memory, similarity perceptions and aspiration levels
on portfolio holdings and asset prices.
One of the assumptions of the paper concerns the constant aspiration level of the investors. On
page 147 of their book, Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001 b) state that: ’’...when the environment is
more or less fixed, and the situation may be modeled as a repeated choice problem, case-based
decision makers do appear to be a little too naive and myopic’’. Further on, they remark that
this myopic behavior can be attributed to constant aspiration levels and proceed to define an
adaptation process which insures optimal behavior in the limit for i.i.d. environments with a
single decision-maker. One might, therefore, conjecture that using the same adaptation process
15 The finding that the curvature of the similarity function determines the preferences for diversification is con-
sistent with the results of Nehring and Puppe (1999). In a different setting, they compute the similarity function
corresponding to preferences for diversity over acts situated on a one-dimensional simplex. They conclude that
preference for diversity implies a similarity function which is convex in the Euclidean distance.
19in an i.i.d. economy would lead to optimal behavior and eliminate the phenomena described
above.
InGuerdjikova(2005), IshowthattheoptimalityresultderivedbyGilboaandSchmeidler(2001
b) strongly depends on the form of the similarity function. For instance, a concave similarity
function in combination with the suggested updating rule implies the choice of the best corner
alternative in the limit, a result very similar to the one derived in this paper. In general, a rule
similar to the one suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001 b), leads to almost optimal deci-
sions
16 only if the similarity function is sufficiently concave near the identity and sufficiently
convex near the corners of the simplex. It is an interesting research question how the results de-
rived here would change if such similarity functions were used. However, this might make the
model computationally intractable.
Moreover, the results derived by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001 b) and Guerdjikova (2005) hold
onlyforindividualdecisionproblems. Eveninarepresentativeconsumereconomytheirvalidity
isjeopardizedbythenon-i.i.d. structureofthedecision-makingprocessand, hence, oftheprice-
and return-processes. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the suggested adaptation process
would lead to optimal results in this setting.
Furthermore, the results derived here suggest that the behavior of the economy remains qualita-
tively identical for whole ranges of values of ¯ u2. Hence, the paper might be seen as describing
theshort-runbehavioroftheeconomyinwhichtheaspirationlevelisadaptedsufficientlyslowly.
The paper also makes the seemingly strong assumption that the memory of the investors in the
economy consists only of cases observed in the past by investors with the same aspiration. It
might seem that working with memory containing a l lp a s tr e t u r n sw o u l dl e a dt oa ne q u i l i b r i u m
where investors choose optimal portfolios and the price of the risky asset coincides with its
price under rational expectations. In Guerdjikova (2004 b, pp. 204-209), I show that adding
hypotheticalcasesmightfailtoenhancelearning. Allowinginvestorstoobserveallhypothetical
past cases leads to an economy with a representative investor (independently of the aspiration
levels of the different types)
17. In the short-run, this gives rise to 0-asset prices or to situations,
in which the bond is not demanded. In the long-run, the observation of hypothetical cases might
16 I.e., satisficing decision-making on a set with arbitrarily small measure.
17 Note that no similarity considerations are needed once the investor observes the past outcomes of all portfolios.
20lead to suboptimal choices in cases in which investors using a smaller number of cases learn to
choose optimally.
The current model has shown that empirically observed patterns such as unused arbitrage pos-
sibilities, limited market participation, the equity premium puzzle, bubbles, excessive volatility
and failure to diversify can emerge in a market populated by case-based investors.
Of course, such an explanation of the empirical observations would only be meaningful if it
could be shown that case-based investors are able to survive in the presence of rational investors
in the market. This is done in Guerdjikova (2004 a), where it is demonstrated that even case-
based investors with one-period memory are able to survive and to influence asset prices in the
presence of expected utility maximizers.
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P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Part 1
The maximal (single period) decline in p∗
t given α1∗
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for all α ∈ [0;1]. Hence, α1∗
t = α0 for all t ≥ 1.

















21and the strict monotonicity of s(·;·) implies U2
1 (α0) >U 2
1 (α) for all α 6= α0. Hence, α2∗
1 =
α1∗
1 = α0 and p∗




























α0 +( 1− α0)(1+r)
¶
= u(1 + δ +( 1− α0)r) ≥ ¯ u
2,
hence, α0 =a r g m a x [0;1] U2
t (α) and, therefore, as in the proof of part 1 of proposition 1,
α2∗
t = α0 and p∗
t = p0 is an equilibrium
19 for all t such that δτ ≥ ˜ δ for all τ ≤ t.L e t
t0 =m i n
n
t | δt < ˜ δ
o






t0 (α0)=vt0 (α0) − ¯ u
2 ≤ u(1 + δt0 +( 1− α0)r) − ¯ u
2 < 0
Sinces((α;pt0);(α0;pt0))isstrictlydecreasingin|α − α0|,type2,whotakespt0 asgiven,choose
α2
t0 =1if α0 < 1
2 and α2
t0 =0if α0 > 1
2.
Case 1: α0 ≥ 1
2.
Then, p∗
t0 = θ1α0 and α2∗







= u(1 + r) > ¯ u
for all t and p∗
t. Hence, the state (α1 = α0;α2 =0 ;p = θ1α0) is stationary.







α0 +( 1− α0)(1+r)
¶
= u(1 + δ +( 1− α0)r) ≤ ¯ u2 <u(1 + r)
for δ < ˜ δ, it follows that
1+δ +( 1− α0)r<1+r
and therefore that for each δ < ˜ δ
δ < α0r<r .




to hold, δ < α0r must be satisfied. If this assumption is violated, no such ˜ δexists.
19 Since α1∗
t = α0 holds for all t, I will use the phrase ’’α2∗
t and p∗




t constitute an equilibrium’’.
20 Similarly, all period numbers introduced hereafter depend on the realized dividend path ˜ ω. I neglect this depen-
dence in the notation for convenience.
22Case 2: α0 < 1
2.
At pt0 = α0, argmax[0;1] U2
t0 (α)=1 .I fα2∗
t0 =1 , p∗
t0 = θ1α0 +( 1− θ1) must hold. Hence, if
vt0 (α0)=u
µ
θ1α0 +( 1− θ1)+δt0
p0










θ1α0 +( 1− θ1)+δt0
p0






t0 (α0) > 0






















for all α ∈ [0;1] and
p
∗
t0 = θ1α0 +( 1− θ1)α
2∗
t0 .
By (A1),s u c hp∗
t0 and α2∗








t00 =0obtainsa.s. forsomet00 =m i n
n
t>t 0 | δt < ˜ δ
o
,
as shown above. If α2∗
t0 < 1
2 construct α2∗
t00 in the same manner as α2∗
t0 . Obviously, α2∗
t00 ∈ (α2∗
t0 ;1).
Repeat the same procedure n times as long as α2∗
tn < 1


















tk−1 = θ1α0 +( 1− θ1)α
2∗
tk−1,
it follows that ptk is given by
ptk = ptk−1
  − (1 + r)
ptk−1 − θ1α0
ptk−1 (1 − θ1)+( 1+r)ptk−1 − δtk (5)
for all k =1 ...n,w h e r e  = u−1 (¯ u2). It remains to show that:
(i) for any of the α2∗























(ii) the sequence α2∗
tk crosses 1
2 from below a.s. in finite time.
23T h es et w os ta t em e n t sa r ep r o v enb el o w .O n c et h i sv al u eo fα2∗
tn ≥ 1
















obtains and from the next period, ¯ t(˜ ω) such that:


























¯ t(˜ ω) = α2∗
t =0for all t>¯ t(˜ ω).S i n c e ¯ t(˜ ω) is a.s. finite, this completes the proof of the
proposition.















































which is satisfied for any k,s i n c eα0 < α∗2
tk and r>δ > δθ1 hold.
(ii) α∗2
tn ≥ 1

































tk−1 (1 − θ1)
p∗
tk−1 − θ1α0
> 1 − θ1,
whereas





is the least amount by which ptk should grow to obtain a value higher than 1−θ1+2θ1α0
2 .
However,







αtk−1 − [  − (1 − α0)(1+r) − α0 − δt0]





























a n db yt h ec h o i c eo ft0,
  − (1 − α0)(1+r) − α0 − δt0 > 0
holds. Hence,




















tk−1 − δt0 ≥ 0.
















tk − p0 > 1−θ1
2 holds. Hence, p∗
tk ≥ 1−θ1+2θ1α0
2 .
Let tz denote the last zth period in which δtk ≤ δt0 obtains. It follows that there exists a tn such
that
t






























tk−1 obtains is less than z is 0 on the set of sample paths of dividend realizations.
Hence, tz and, therefore, also tn are a.s. finite.
Part 3
As shown above, for u(1 + δ +( 1− α0)r) < ¯ u2 either α2∗
t =0or α2∗
t =1obtains a.s. in
finite time ¯ t.
Case 1: α2∗
¯ t =0 , p∗
¯ t = θ1α0.
α
2∗













¯ t+1 =1 − θ1 (1 − α0)
25Case 2: α2∗
¯ t =1 , p∗



























¯ t+1 = θ1α0.
Case 3: α2∗
¯ t =1 , p∗
¯ t =1− θ1 (1 − α0) and δ¯ t+1 > ˆ δ.
α
2∗




t+1 (α)=a r gm a x
α∈[0;1]



















¯ t+1 =1 − θ1 (1 − α0),
since














t+1 =1− θ1 (1 − α0) p∗
t+1 = θ1α0
p∗
t =1− θ1 (1 − α0) q 1 − q
p∗
t = θ1α0 1 0
⎞
⎠,
where q =P r
n
δ ≥ ˆ δ
o
. The invariant probabilities of the states h and l(as defined in the









The proof of part 3 shows that a cycle with two states h and l emerges after a finite number of
periods ¯ t. Cases 1 and 2 considered in the proof of part 3 are still valid. It remains to consider
Case 3: p∗
¯ t = ph, α2∗
¯ t =1and δ¯ t+1 ≥ ˆ δ.
α
2∗



















v¯ t+1 (1) − ¯ u
2¤
=0




as defined in the statement of the proposition exists if
δθ1 <r ,
which is always satisfied under the assumptions made.
26p
∗
¯ t+1 = θ1α0,
since
v¯ t+1 (1) = u
µ
p¯ t+1 + δ¯ t+1
1 − θ1 (1 − α0)
¶
< ¯ u
2 for any p¯ t+1 ≤ 1 − θ1 (1 − α0).









vτ (α0) − ¯ u
2¤
,
behaves as a random walk on R as long as α2∗
t = α0. It has a positive expected increment, since
E [vt (α0)] = µ(α0 | p0) > ¯ u
2.
Accordingtotheorem9.5.1inMainandTweedie(1996,p. 228)suchrandomwalksaretransient,
hence the expected time until their first return to 0 is infinite.
Part 2






t (α0),i f U2
t (α0) ≥ 0




µ(α0 | p0) < ¯ u
2
implies that ˜ U2
t (α0) is a random walk on R
+
0 with negative expected increments. For such
random walks all compact sets are regular, see proposition 11.4.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996,




obtains in finite time with probability 1. Since the distribution Q is continuous, it follows that
U
2
t (α0) < 0
obtains a. s. in finite time.
Once U2
t (α0) < 0 holds, apply the proof of part 3 of proposition 1 to show that α2∗
¯ t =0
or α2∗
¯ t =1obtains a.s. in finite time. This result can be applied, since in period ¯ t(˜ ω) (as







=0for all tk ≤ tn−1,w h e r e a s
22 In the case of long memory, however, the time periods tk will not denote the subsequent periods in which the

















− ¯ u2 < 0,
27V 2
¯ t(˜ ω) (α2∗
tn) ≤ 0.S i n c e
¯ u
2 <u(1 + r) <µ(1 | 1 − θ1 (1 − α0)).
V 2
t (α2∗
¯ t ) and U2
t (α2∗
¯ t ) behave as random walks with positive expected increments and remain
positive infinitely long in expectations. Hence, the expected time during which the investors of
type 2 hold α =1or α =0is infinity.
Furthermore, for any portfolio α:
U
2
t (α)=s((pt;α);((1− θ1 (1 − α0);1)))V
2






















Obviously, if exactly one of the numbers V 2
t (1), V 2
t (0) or V 2
t (α2∗
tn) is positive, then the cor-
responding act is chosen in the next period of time. The case-based decision rule precludes
the case that two of these numbers are positive simultaneously at some t.T h i si ss h o w ni nt h e
following lemma:
Lemma 7 Type 2 abandons a portfolio α only in periods ˜ t such that V 2
˜ t (α) < 0.
P r o o fo fl e m m a7
In the proof of proposition 1, it has already been shown that the statement of the lemma is true
up to time ¯ t such that ¯ t =m i n{t | U2
t (α0) < 0}.
To argue by induction, suppose that the statement holds up to a period t−1and consider period
t.L e tα2∗
τ ∈ {α1...αl} with αl = αt and define p∗ (αi) as:
p
∗ (αi)= :α0θ1 +( 1− θ1)αi for i ∈ {1...l}.
Let V 2































≥ 0 holds. The portfolio α2∗
tk (and, hence, the price p∗





















− ¯ u2 =0
Hence, U2
tk (α)=0for each α ∈ [0;1] and, therefore, the choices till time tk do not influence the evaluation
of the available portfolios.
28where ¯ t00−1=m a x{τ | α2∗
τ 6= l}. The inequality follows from the fact that V 2
¯ t00 (αl) ≤ 0,s i n c e
either act αl has been chosen for the first time at ¯ t00 and, therefore, V 2
¯ t00 (αl)=0or αl has been





t00 (αl) < 0






holds for i ∈ {1...l − 1}.
Furthermore, since α2∗










∗ (αl))) + V
2








































¯ t00 (αl) − U¯ t00 (α) ≥ 0.
Hence, α2∗
t+1 = αl if V 2
t (αl) ≥ 0and hence, an act αl can be only abandoned in a period ˜ t such
that V 2
˜ t (αl) < 0 holds.
Hence, at most one of the numbers V 2
t (1), V 2
t (0) and V 2
t (α2∗
tn) can be positive in which case
the act with the positive V 2
t will be chosen. If all of them are negative, then the concavity of
s(·;·)implies that U2
t (α) is a convex function of α. Therefore, α2∗
t ∈ {0;1}.
On all paths of dividend realizations, on which U2
t (1) ≥ U2
t (0) holds for all t ≥ ¯ t(˜ ω), α2∗
t =1
has a frequency of 1. On those paths, on which U2
t (1) <U 2
t (0)obtains for some T ≥ ¯ t(˜ ω),
α2∗
T+1 =0 . Then,
u(1 + r) > ¯ u
2
implies that U2
t (1) <U 2
t (0) and α2∗






2 ∈ (u(1 + r);µ(1 | 1 − θ1 (1 − α0))),( 7 )
either α2∗
¯ t =1or α2∗
¯ t =0obtains in finite time, as shown in part 2 of this proof. If α2∗
¯ t =0then
(7) implies that U2
t (0) <U 2
t (1)obtains in finite time. If α2∗
¯ t =1 ,t h e nU2
t (1) behaves like a
randomwalkwithpositiveexpectedincrementsandα2∗
t =1holdsinfinitelylonginexpectation.
As in part 2, the concavity of s(·;·) implies that α2∗
t ∈ {0;1} for all t ≥ ¯ t.
If U2
t (0) >U 2
t (1) obtains at some time t and, therefore α2∗
t =0 , the argument above shows
that U2
t0 (0) <U 2
t0 (1) will obtain again for some finite t0 >t , hence α2∗














and these events are independent, the probability that such events occur infinitely often is 0.
Hence, in the limit, a.s. α2∗
t =1holds with frequency 1.
Part 4
Now, let ¯ u2 >µ(1 | 1 − θ1 (1 − α0)).L e tsdenote:
s = s((p =1− θ1 (1 − α0);α =1 );( p = θ1α0;α =0 ) )∈ [0;1).
As above, it can be shown that there is a finite ¯ t such that α2∗
t ∈ {0;1} for all t ≥ ¯ t.D e n o t eb y




































− ¯ u2 < 0




for t ≥ 1.
It is easily seen that
εt (1 − s)=U
2


































Denote by P the transition probability kernel of εt. The idea of the proof consists in showing
30thatεt isastationaryprocesswithaninvariantprobabilitymeasureπ, asdefinedinthestatement
of the proposition. If εt ≥ 0, α2∗
t =1 ,i fεt < 0, α2∗


















The following lemmas and proposition prove that εt is a positive recurrent Harris chain and,
hence, has an invariant probability distribution by using the following intermediate steps:
1. Lemma 8 identifies a small set G, which is also a petite set.
2. Lemma 9 uses the small set G to show that εt is ψ-irreducible, where ψ denotes the Lebesgue
measure on G and is 0,e l s e w h e r e .
3. Proposition10reproduced fromMeynand Tweedie(1996)statesthat ψ-irreducibilityimplies
positive recurrence if G is reached in finite expected time from any value of ε.
In a last step, I demonstrate that the condition of 10 is satisfied for the chain ε and compute the
invariant probability distribution.
Denote by G the interval [0; ¯ u2 − u(1 + r)]. The following lemma shows that the set G is a














K (ε;F) ≥ ν (F)
for any set F ∈ Ψ0 and any ε ∈ G,w h e r ePK (ε;F)denotes the probability to reach a set F
starting from εin K steps, see Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 111).
Lemma 8 The set G =[ 0 ;¯ u2 − u(1 + r)]is small.
P r o o fo fl e m m a8 :
The assumption about the probability distribution of δ and the continuity of the utility function
31u(·) imply that the net utility realizations









t =1(as long as U2
t (1) ≥ U2
t (0)) are distributed according to a probability distribution
Q0, which has an absolutely continuous part with respect to the Lebesgue measure on the real
numbers. Moreover, there is a number ζ
0, such that the density of ˜ u, g0 satisfies
g
0 (˜ u) ≥ φ




0 ∈ (0; ¯ u2 − u(1 + r)) and for some φ
0.
Divide the set G into K sets, G1...GK with length less than
ζ0
2 . Fix an initial ε ∈ Gi and suppose
that F ⊂ Gj. Now, for each 0 < ξ <
ζ0

































Now choose ξ such that ξ (K − 1) ≤
ζ0
2 holds. Then,
Pr{Gj − εK−1 ≤ ζ
0 | ε0 = ε} ≥ [φ
0ξ]
K−1 ,
where Gj − εK−1 is the largest distance between a point in Gj and εK−1. Hence,
P (εK−1;F | Gj − εK−1 ≤ ζ
0)=Q




0 (˜ u)d˜ u ≥ φ
0λ(F),
where λdenote the Lebesgue measure. Hence,
P





















i=1Fi = F and Fi ⊂ Gi,i . e .Fi is a partition of F into sets each of which is a (possibly
empty) subset of some Gi. Since for all F such that F ∩ G = ∅,
P
K (ε;F) ≥ 0,




0λ(F), F ⊂ G
32ν (F)=0 ,e l s e .
According to proposition 5.5.3 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 127), G is also a petite set.
The next Lemma demonstrates that the Markov chain defined by εt is ϕ-irreducible. It defines
am e a s u r eϕ, with ϕ(F) > 0 only if F ⊂ Ψ0 satisfies
P
k (ε;F) > 0
for some k ∈ Nand all ε ∈ Ψ0, see Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 91).
Lemma 9 Let ϕ be defined as the Lebesgue measure on the set G and be 0 elsewhere. Then
t h eM a r k o vc h a i nε is ϕ-irreducible.
P r o o fo fl e m m a9 :
Obviously, ϕ assigns a positive probability only to subsets of the interval G. Since it has been
shownthatstartingfromanyε ∈ G,PK (ε;F) > 0forallF ⊂ G, itremainstodemonstratethat
for each ε / ∈ G, Pk (ε;G) > 0 for some k ∈ N. First let ε < 0.T h e nεt+1 = εt+¯ u2 −u(1 + r)



























































for all ε / ∈ G. Hence, the Markov chain is ϕ-irreducible.
Since ϕ is finite, according to proposition 4.2.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 92), there exists







n (ε;F) > 0
!
=0 .
ψ is absolutely continuous with respect to ϕ.D e n o t eb yB(Ψ0)the Borel σ-algebra on Ψ0.L e t
B
+ (Ψ
0)= :{F ∈ B(Ψ
0) | ψ(F) > 0}.
Obviously, G ∈ B+ (Ψ0).
We can now use part (ii) of theorem 10.4.10 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 254):
Proposition 10 (MeynandTweedie,1996,p. 254)SupposethataMarkovchainisψ-irreducible.
Let τG denote the first hitting time of the set G. The chain is positive recurrent, if for some petite
set G ∈ B+ (Ψ0)
sup
ε∈G
Eε [τG] < ∞. (8)
33P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 0 :
See Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 254).
It has been shown that εt is ψ-irreducible and G is a petite set with ψ(G) > 0. It remains,
to show (8). Consider ˜ εt = εt if εt ≥ 0 and ˜ εt =0 ,e l s e .˜ εt is a random walk on a half line
with negative expected increments. By proposition 11.4.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p. 278)
for such a random walk, all compact sets are regular. Since G is compact and G ∈ B+ (Ψ0),i t
follows that for all F ∈ B+ (Ψ0),
sup
ε∈G




Eε [τG] < ∞ (9)
holds for the process ˜ εt.
Hence, on all paths on which εt ≥ 0holds for all t, εt coincides with˜ εt and Gis reached in finite
expected time. On those paths, on which εt < 0 holds for some t,t h et i m en e e d e dt or e a c hG is
at most:





¯ u2 − u(1 + r)
< ∞.
Therefore, (8) is satisfied and εt is positive recurrent. Furthermore, (9) implies that εt is a
positive recurrent Harris chain. Hence, by Theorem 10.0.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p.
238), there exists an invariant probability measure π.





¯ u2 − u(1 + r)
¯ u2 − µr
a
.
According to the SLLN, if α2∗




t (1) = −∞
holds. Analogously, if α2∗




















t (1) − (1 − s)V
2
t (0) = −∞.
34Hence, a.s. there exists a period T>Lsuch that U2
t (0) >U 2
t (1) for all t>Tand nevertheless
α2∗
















¢¯ ¯ = ∞.
It can be shown that
U
2
t (1) − U
2
t (0) = (1 − s)εt
remains a.s. bounded above. Obviously, α2∗
t =1iff εt ≥ 0. Suppose that there is a sequence
of periods t0, t00..., such that εt0, εt00... grows to infinity. In other words, suppose that for each








¢¯ ¯ = ∞,
lim
t→∞|{t | εt < 0}| = ∞.
If εtn >N, the time needed to reach εt < 0 is at least
N





which grows to infinity, as εtn becomes very large. However, we know that
˜ N =s u p
ε∈G
Eε [τG] < ∞.
The LLN then implies that for each κ > 0, there is a.s. a period K with Pn
i=1 τGi
n
≤ ˜ N + κ
for all n ≥ K. However, εtn →∞implies that there is a time K0 such that τGi > ˜ N + κ for all
i ≥ K0. Hence, it is possible to choose n large enough, so that Pn
i=1 τGi
n
> ˜ N + κ,
a contradiction. Hence, almost each sequence εt0, εt00... (with α2∗
t =1at t0, t00...) is bounded
above and below.
At times at which α2∗
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=1 .( 1 0 )
Now define a function ιh : Ψ0 → {0;1} with
ιh (x)=
(
1 if x ∈ [0;+∞)











It is clear that ιh ∈ L1 (Ψ0;B(Ψ0);π).S i n c eε is positive Harris recurrent, theorem 17.1.7 in


















obtains a.s. and the limit frequency of α2∗









































u(1 + r) − ¯ u
2¢
,














u(1 + r) − ¯ u2
µr
1 − ¯ u2
obtain a.s.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
The proof of the proposition proceeds in two steps. First, I show that for each open set A0 ⊂
[0;1], α2∗
t ∈ A0 holds in an infinite number of periods. This is an implication of the convexity
of the similarity function and the negativity of net expected payoffs. Second, as in the proof of
proposition2, itisshownthatU2
t (α)−U2
t (α0)remainsboundedinthelimitforallα,α0 ∈ [0;1].














¯ ¯ < ∞ for all α
0 6= α
cannot obtain on an equilibrium path, since for all α0 6= α
µ(α | p


















∗ (α)))] →− ∞a.s.,














¯ ¯ = ∞for some α
0, α






¯ ¯ < ∞ for all α 6= α
0, α
00.
Then, there exists a T such that α2
t ∈ {α0;α00}for all t>T. Denote the distinct acts chosen in





























By lemma 7, type 2 abandons a portfolio α only if V 2
t (α) < 0. Hence, V 2
t (αi) < 0holds for
all i =1 ...l.W h e r e a sV 2










a.s.. Hence, for almost each path ω t h e r ee x i s t sat(ω) such that V 2
t (α0) < 0 and V 2
t (α00) < 0
for all t ≥ t(ω).
Since the similarity function is convex, it follows that U2























































for any p ∈ [0;1]. Hence, on almost each path ω, there exists a T0 (ω) such that there are α000,















hold at the equilibrium prices for all t ≥ T0 (ω) and still α2∗
t ∈ {α0;α00}. This contradicts the
case-based rule. Clearly, the argument does not depend on the number of portfolios which are
chosen infinitely often, as long as this number remains finite. Hence, an infinite (but countable)
set of portfolios A0 ⊂ [0;1] must be chosen infinitely often by the investors of type 2.
Suppose now that A0 does not contain an act out of Bx ( ) for some x ∈ (0;1).B ya na r g u m e n t
similar to the above, we could find an element of Bx ( ), ˜ α which has been chosen only for a
finite number of times and show that from some point of time T00 (ω), the cumulative utility for
the investors of type 2 of the portfolios in the interval
(supA
0\[x +  ;1];˜ α)
i sac o n c a v ef u n c t i o nf o ra l lt ≥ T00 (ω). Hence, for all
α ∈ (supA






0\[x +  ;1]).
Since the similarity function is continuous, so is the cumulative utility function and therefore,
t h e r ee x i s t sap o r t f o l i oα0 ∈ A0 which is chosen infinitely often by the investors of type 2 and
the cumulative utility (for type 2) of which lies below the cumulative utility of α in each period
t ≥ T00 (ω), a contradiction.
To complete the proof of the proposition, I now show that the difference between the cumulative
utilities of any two portfolios:
U
2
t (α) − U
2
t (α
0)= :˜ εt (α;α
0) (11)

















t (α)+˜ εt (α;α0)
=1
holds on all paths on which ˜ εt (α;α0)remains bounded.
38Hence, the proof of the following lemma completes the proof of proposition 3:
Lemma 11 Define ˜ εt (α;α0) as in (11). On almost each path ω, ˜ εt (α;α0) is bounded.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 1
Consider first the portfolios in A0 which are chosen infinitely often by the investors of type 2.
For these acts, the proof that the difference between their cumulative utilities remains bounded
with probability 1is analogous to the argument used in the proof of proposition 2 on page 34.
It has been shown that there is no open subset of [0;1] such that A0 does not contain a portfolio
out of this interval, hence for each   > 0,a n dx ∈ (0;1),t h e r ei sa nα ∈ A0 ∩Bx ( ). Moreover,








where ˜ α ∈ A0 ∩ Bx ( ) and α ∈ A0, α 6=˜ α.S i n c e
lim
 →0A
0 ∩ Bx ( )=x
and U2








even if x/ ∈ A0. This completes the proof of the proposition.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
The proof of proposition 3 has shown that if there is an open subset ˜ A ⊂ [0;1] such that
µ(α | p
∗ (α)) − ¯ u
2 > 0
for all α ∈ ˜ A, then the investors of type 2 will eventually choose a portfolio out of this set. The
same proof further implies that the set of infinitely chosen acts cannot lie completely outside
˜ A. This means that limt→∞ |C2
t (α)| = ∞for some α ∈ ˜ A. Suppose, contrary to the statement
of the proposition, that there are two distinct portfolios from ˜ A, α 6= α0, chosen with positive
frequency by type 2. It is easy to show that this leads to a contradiction.
Indeed, consider the periods z1α, z2α,...∈ Nin which type 2 switches to act α and denote by z1α0,











z3α (α) > ...
But these inequalities imply that V 2
t (α), which (as long as α is chosen by type 2) is a random
walk with positive expected increment µ(α | p∗ (α)) − ¯ u2 > 0, crosses each of the infinitely
39many boundaries V 2
zkα (α) from above. Since, however, there is a positive probability that a ran-
domwalkwithpositiveexpectedincrementstartingfromagivenpoint,nevercrossesaboundary
lying below this point, see Grimmet and Stirzaker (1994, p. 144), and since the stopping times
areindependentlydistributed, itfollowsthattheprobabilityofinfinitelymanyswitchesbetween
α and α0 is 0. Hence, only one of these two portfolios can be chosen by type 2 with positive








¯ ¯ = ∞
with α0 ∈ [0;1]\ ˜ A. Then, a.s. for any K>0,t h e r ee x i s t saˆ T (ω) such that
U
2
t (α) − U
2
t (α
0) >Kfor all t ≥ ˆ T (ω)
and nevertheless, α2∗
t = α0 for some t>ˆ T (ω), contradicting the case-based rule.
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y5
Proposition 4 states that both types choose some portfolio αi∗ (i ∈ {1;2}) with frequency one



































holds. Hence, the condition of preference for diversification is trivially satisfied. If, however,



















∗;α2)k.( 1 2 )







∗;βα1 +( 1− β)α2)k



















s((p∗;α∗);(p∗;βα1 +( 1− β)α2))
s((p∗;α∗);(p∗;αk))
≥ 1.
In the case of high aspiration level (proposition 3), the reasoning for type 1 is equivalent. For








preference for diversification trivially obtains.
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y6
Thestatementabouttype1obtainstriviallyfromtheproofofCorollary5,aswellasthestatement
that type 2 exhibit preferences for diversification as long as
¯ u
2 <µ(1 | p
∗ (1)).
















for all α ∈ (0;1). Note that each such αcan be written as
α · 1+( 1− α) · 0,
which completes the proof demonstrating that type 2 has no preference for diversification in this
case.
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